The Participation of Charities in Limited Partnerships by Schill, Michael H.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1984
The Participation of Charities in Limited
Partnerships
Michael H. Schill
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael H. Schill, Note, "The Participation of Charities in Limited Partnerships", 93 Yale Law Journal 1355 (1984).
The Participation of Charities in Limited
Partnerships
In recent years, the activities of tax-exempt charities have increased
both in number and in complexity." To finance this upsurge in activity,
charities have had to seek out new sources of revenue. Some have raised
capital by joining with profit-motivated investors in limited partnerships.2
In its capacity as the general partner, a charity can ensure that the funds
and services it contributes are properly used to accomplish charitable
objectives.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has reacted inconsistently to the
participation of charities in limited partnerships, allowing such arrange-
ments in some instances, while disapproving them in others. The IRS op-
poses the participation of charities in limited partnerships on the ground
that the charity will further the private interests of profit-motivated lim-
ited partners in violation of the Internal Revenue Code's requirement that
tax-exempt charities be operated exclusively for public purposes. The IRS
further argues that the fiduciary duty that a charity owes to its limited
partners will make it vulnerable to a conflict of interest between maximiz-
ing profits and achieving its charitable goals. Finally, distributions to lim-
ited partners might constitute a diversion of the charity's resources to the
private persons who control its operations; charities might unfairly com-
pete with noncharitable organizations for capital; and transferring tax
benefits from tax-exempt to taxable entities through a limited partnership
is contrary to public policy.
Although this Note takes no position on whether charities should be
encouraged to form limited partnerships to raise capital,3 it does argue
that such arrangements are often consistent with the principles underlying
1. Between 1968 and 1979, the total number of tax-exempt charities increased from 137,500 to
293,900. See Weisbrod, Assets and Employment in the Nonprofit Sector, 10 PUB. FIN. Q. 403, 412-13
(1982); see also Hansmann, The Rationale For Exempting Nonprofit Organizations From Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) (noting growth in scope of nonprofit activities).
2. A limited partnership is a type of partnership comprised of one or more general partners who
manage the business and who are personally liable for partnership debts, and one or more limited
partners, who contribute capital and share in profits but who take no part in running the business
and incur no liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond contribution. See Evans v.
Galardi, 16 Cal. 3d 300, 305, 546 P.2d 313, 317, 128 Cal. Rptr. 25, 29 (1976); UNIF. LsMrrEv
PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 1-10, 6 U.L.A. 561, 562-90 (1969).
3. A discussion of the desirability of the current federal tax policy encouraging the provision of
public goods and services by the charitable private sector through tax incentives is also beyond the
scope of this Note. For a general discussion of this issue, see S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX RE-
FORM 223-32 (1973) (criticizing charitable gift deduction); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax
Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 56-62 (1972) (asserting that charitable gift
deduction is desirable).
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the federal policy of exempting such organizations from taxation4 and per-
mitting them to receive tax deductible donations from private individuals.'
Partnership distributions do not necessarily reflect a purpose to benefit
private individuals; a carefully drafted partnership agreement can help to
prevent conflicts of interest; there is no evidence that charities unfairly
compete with private enterprises for capital; finally, although the limited
partnership vehicle may enable charities to transfer tax benefits to taxable
entities, current tax policy permits such transfers as long as they have
economic substance.
I. CHARITIES AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts certain nonprofit
organizations,6 ranging from colleges and hospitals to social clubs and
credit unions, from paying federal income taxes. Section 501(c)(3) de-
scribes those entities "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific . . . or educational purposes . . . ." Organizations
that fall within Section 501(c)(3) are frequently termed charities.8 In ad-
dition to their exemption from federal income taxation and their ability to
receive tax-deductible donations,9 charities also receive favorable treatment
in many other areas of the law: They are not required to pay federal
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
5. Id. § 170.
6. Hansmann defines a nonprofit organization as "an organization that is barred from distribut-
ing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers,
directors, or trustees." Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) refers to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational pur-
poses, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Among the numerous tax-exempt organizations excluded from § 501(c)(3) are labor organizations,
business leagues, social dubs, fraternal societies, life insurance companies, and credit unions. I.R.C. §
501(c) (1982).
8. The term "charities" encompasses both private foundations and publicly supported charities.
The Code classifies all § 501(c)(3) organizations except those with broad public support or those that
function in a supporting role to publicly supported charities as private foundations. I.R.C. § 509(a)
(1982). Private foundations are subject to extensive regulation by the federal government regarding
their investments and distributions. See id. §§ 4941-4945. Private foundations must also pay an an-
nual tax on net investment income. See id. § 4940. See generally B. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAX
ExEMPr ORGANI.AMONs 375-540 (4th ed. 1983) (summarizing federal tax treatment of private
foundations).
9. I.R.C. § 170 (1982).
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unemployment taxes; 10 they pay preferential mailing rates;"1 and they are
not subject to involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. 12
To qualify as a charity under Section 501(c)(3), an organization must
fulfill several requirements. First, the applicant must satisfy the "organi-
zational test" by limiting its purposes, in its charter, to one or more ex-
empt objectives. The organization must not expressly empower itself to
engage in more than an "insubstantial" number of activities that would
not further these exempt purposes.1" Second, the organization must satisfy
the "operational test," which requires it to engage primarily in activities
that accomplish one or more exempt purposes. If more than an "insub-
stantial part" of its activities further a non-exempt purpose, then the or-
ganization fails the operational test.14 The organization must also ensure
that none of its net earnings inure to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual.1 5
One of the principal rationales behind the favorable tax treatment ac-
corded charities is the belief that, by providing public goods and services
through the private sector, charitable organizations lessen the burdens of
10. Id. § 3306(c)(8).
11. 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1960).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960) states:
An organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes
only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt pur-
poses specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an
insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.
15. In addition to the explicit statement in the text of § 501(c)(3), the prohibition on inurement of
net earnings appears twice in the Treasury Regulations accompanying the statute. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2) (1960) provides: "An organization is not operated exclusively for one or more
exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or
individuals."
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1960) provides:
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes...
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, to meet the requirement of this
subdivision, it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated
for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family,
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private
interests.
The inurement clause prohibits "private shareholders or individuals" from receiving both monetary
and non-monetary benefits from the charity. For a description of various types of inurement, see B.
HoPKiNs, supra note 8, at 217-28. Most commentators and courts apply the inurement prohibition
only to those individuals who are insiders of the charity or to those who otherwise maintain some
direct control over its operations. See infra p. 1369.
The organization must also ensure that only an insubstantial part of its activities goes towards
legislative lobbying. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i) (1960). Many organizations exempt from
taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), however, may participate in efforts to influence legislation regard-
less of whether such activities constitute a substantial part of their total activities. The Code permits
such organizations to engage in lobbying and grassroots activities as long as the amount of funds
devoted to such endeavors falls below specified ceilings. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (1982). Charities that
desire to be judged under this standard rather than the substantiality test must elect such treatment.
See id. § 501(h)(3).
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government and thus ultimately save it money."8 In addition, some believe
that providing public goods and services through the private, rather than
public, sector is inherently desirable in a pluralistic society.17 Finally,
some analysts argue that as a matter of tax theory charities cannot be
taxed and donations should be deductible.1'
II. THE USE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS By CHARITIES
A. Raising Capital Through Limited Partnerships
In recent years, the nonprofit sector has grown dramatically in both size
and scope.' 9 Especially in light of current cutbacks in both federal funding
and federal provision of social services,20 charities require larger amounts
of capital to support their growing list of activities, 2" the most capital in-
tensive of which include the production of theatrical and artistic events,
the purchase of scientific and medical equipment, and the construction of
low-and moderate-income housing. To raise money for these activities,
16. According to the House report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1938:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is
based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part II) C.B. 728, 742;
see R. DESIDERIO & S. TAYLOR, PLANNING TAX ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 4.03, at 4-15 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C. 1971) ("[Slociety can be seen
as benefiting not only from the application of private wealth to specific purposes in the public interest
but also from the variety of choices made by individual philanthropists as to which activities to subsi-
dize."), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Broughton, The Economic Function of
Foundations, FOUND. NEWS, Sept. 1964, at 1, 2-4 (free enterprise in philanthropy leads to creative
innovation).
18. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 347-75
(1972) (charitable gifts should not be included in taxable income of donor); Bittker & Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 307-16
(1976) (nonprofit organizations are not suitable targets for an income tax).
19. See Sumariwalla, Preliminary Observations on Scope, Size and Classification of the Sector, in
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, WORKING PAPERS FOR SPRING RESEARCH FORUM: SINCE THE FILER COM-
MISSION 181, 197-200 (1983). From 1960 to 1975, the share of the gross national product originating
in the nonprofit sector (in current dollars) increased by more than 52%. Id. at 197. From 1975 to
1980, revenues received by nonprofit organizations approximately doubled, reaching $180 billion in
1980. Id. at 199. An estimated 5.6 million persons were employed by philanthropic organizations in
1980. Id. at 198; see also Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 TOLEDO L. REV.
962, 965-68 (1979) (related statistics on growth of philanthropic sector).
20. A recent study estimates that current budget proposals would cut federal aid to nonprofit
organizations by $33 billion over 1982-1985. See L. SALAMON & A. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL
BUDGET AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 46 (1982). Demand for nonprofit services would greatly
increase over this time period due to federal social service cutbacks. See id. at 1-2; see also Coyle,
Reagan Budget Cuts Leave Non-Profits Slashing Staff, Scrambling For Help, 15 NAT'L J. 1630
(1983) (describing how nonprofit organizations are adapting to budget cuts).
21. See J. CRIMMINS & M. KEIL, ENTERPRISE IN THE NONPROFIT SEcTOR 22-23 (1983);
Skloot, Should Not-For-Profits Go Into Business?, 61 HARV. BUS. REV. 20 (1983).
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several charities have participated as general partners in limited partner-
ships with profit-motivated investors.22
Certain factors make the limited partnership an important and attrac-
tive vehicle for charities or other nonprofit organizations seeking addi-
tional funds. First, many conventional sources of capital are closed to non-
profit organizations either because of prohibitions within state law23 or
because of the reluctance of commercial firms to lend to charities.2" The
limited partnership gives the nonprofit organization access to funds from
people who are willing to invest in activities that have some chance of
generating a return on invested capital and, at the very least, promise
attractive tax benefits.25 The limited liability of such a partnership may
22. See infra p. 1361.
23. State law prevents charities from issuing equity stock, thereby foreclosing one method of ac-
quiring capital. The Model Non-Profit Act states:
A corporation shall not have or issue shares of stock. No dividend shall be paid and no part of
the income or profit of a corporation shall be distributed to its members, directors or officers.
MODEL NON-PROFrr Aar § 26 (1964). The Model Act has been adopted in whole or in part in a
substantial number of states. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497, 528 (1981).
24. Commercial lending institutions are frequently reluctant to lend to nonprofit organizations on
terms comparable to business firms because of the risk th.y perceive in making loans to organizations
that are not profit-motivated, generally have small net worths, and frequently have no track record of
successful projects. Interview with Clark Maylone, Exec. Dir., Nonprofit Management Assoc., Wash-
ington, D.C. (Aug. 3, 1983). Cf. Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxa-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1029 & n.36 (1982) (lenders may charge nonprofit organizations inter-
est rates that exceed competitive returns due to a belief that such borrowers may be "untrustworthy
users of investment funds").
In addition, firms may avoid lending to nonprofit organizations due to the risk inherent in many of
these organizations' activities. Frequently, nonprofit organizations will become involved in projects
that the profit-motivated sector has rejected because the risk of the projects is not justified by their
profitability. For example, many nonprofit organizations have sponsored housing for low- and moder-
ate-income households in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. Profit-motivated developers will often
bypass such projects because of perceived risks such as further neighborhood deterioration, arson, and
community opposition. See M. Schill, Nonprofit Housing For Low and Moderate Income Households
15 & n.34 (unpublished paper on file with Yale Law Journal).
Finally, creditors may avoid making loans to nonprofit organizations since many of these organiza-
tions are immune to actions for involuntary reorganization under the bankruptcy law. Under 11
U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982), an entity that is "not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation" is not
subject to an action for involuntary reorganization. Charitable organizations are considered to fall
within this exception. See In re Allen Univ., 497 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1974) (university not subject
to action for involuntary reorganization under § 22 of the former Bankruptcy Act); S. REP'. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5818 (eleemosy-
nary institutions such as churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations exempt from
involuntary bankruptcy).
25. The Internal Revenue Code accords limited partnerships the same tax treatment as other
types of partnerships. It provides that: "A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax
imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only
in their separate or individual capacities." I.R.C. § 701 (1982). Each partner is required individually
to take into account his or her appropriate distributive share of the specified classes of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit. See id. § 702(a).
In many instances, the income from a partnership's activities alone will be too small to justify
investment by limited partners. The "flow through" nature of items of partnership income, gain, and
loss for tax purposes will often increase the return considerably. Since most partnership activities
entail significant "up-front" expenditures, partners will be entitled to large tax deductions in the
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also attract investors, especially in light of the high risk of many charita-
ble activities.2"
In addition to being an important source of capital, the limited partner-
ship is a particularly appropriate vehicle for conducting charitable activi-
ties. The charity, as general partner, will have sole control over the use of
the invested funds and can therefore ensure that they will be used for the
purpose to which the organization is dedicated.2 In addition, the limited
partnership agreement can be drawn to relieve the general partner of any
obligation to repay, out of its own account, the funds invested by the lim-
ited partners."
B. The IRS' Position on the Participation of Charities in Limited
Partnerships
The IRS has taken inconsistent positions on whether a section 501(c)(3)
organization may participate as a general partner in a limited partnership
without losing its section 501(c)(3) status. In several private letter rulings,
the IRS has said that section 501(c)(3) hospitals may form limited part-
nerships with doctors to build medical office buildings for the doctors' use
without jeopardizing the hospitals' tax exemptions or their ability to re-
partnership's early years. See, e.g., id. § 162 (trade or business expenses); id. § 174 (research and
experimental expenditures). When added to deductions frequently made available through accelerated
depreciation and credits such as the Investment Tax Credit, individual partners will frequently be
able to recover the cost of their investment very quickly, thereby increasing their rates of return. See
id. § 46 (investment tax credit); id. §§ 167, 168 (accelerated depreciation). Furthermore, when allo-
cated deductions and credits exceed the partners' income from the partnership, they may be utilized to
offset income from other sources and reduce federal tax liability, thereby increasing the rate of return
on the partnership investment. Finally, in many instances the gain from the sale of a limited partner-
ship interest may be taxed as capital gain rather than ordinary income. See id. § 741. See generally
W. McKFE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
(1977) (describing taxation of partnerships).
26. "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the
exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business."
UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969); see also REV. UNIF. LIMITED PART-
NERSHip Acr § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 224 (Supp. 1984) ("[A] limited partner is not liable for the obliga-
tions of a limited partnership unless . . . he takes part in the control of the business.").
27. To retain their limited liability, limited partners may not take part in the control or manage-
ment of the partnership. The Uniform Act restricts the rights of limited partners to the right to be
informed and the right to petition for dissolution. See REV. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303,
6 U.L.A. 224 (Supp. 1984); UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 10, 6 U.L.A. 590 (1969). The
general partner's control over the limited partnership is typically much greater than it would be in
either a general partnership or a joint venture.
28. See Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939) ("[T]he partners of
either a general or limited partnership, as between themselves, may include in the partnership articles
any agreement they wish concerning the sharing of profits and losses, priorities of distribution...
and other matters."). The charity, however, will still have unlimited liability with respect to partner-
ship obligations to third parties. See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9, 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969)
(general partner in a limited partnership subject to all liabilities of partnership with no limited part-
ners); Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 8 Ariz. App. 424, 446 P.2d 934 (1968) (general partner may be
liable for all debts of limited partnership).
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ceive tax-deductible donations.2" In these rulings, the IRS stated that the
partnership activities furthered the hospitals' exempt purposes and only
incidentally served the private interests of the doctors."0 The IRS has sim-
ilarly allowed tax-exempt hospitals to form joint ventures and limited
partnerships with affiliated doctors to purchase expensive medical
equipment.31
In contrast, the IRS has challenged the participation of section
501(c)(3) organizations in limited partnerships whose purposes were to
produce theatrical plays 2 or to build housing for low- and moderate-
income households.33 The IRS argued that in these cases the nonprofit
organization furthered the interests of the limited partners, thereby violat-
ing the operational test,34 and that the charity's participation created a
29. IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 83-25,133 (Mar. 22, 1983) reprinted in IRS L-rrER RULiNGS REP.
(CCH) No. 330 (June 29, 1983); IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 82-26,146 (undated), reprinted in IRS LEr-
TER RULINGS REP. (CCH) No. 280 (July 15, 1982); IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 82-17,022 (Jan. 26,
1982), reprinted in IRS LErTER RUUNGS REP. (CCH) No. 270 (May 5, 1982).
30. For example, in Priv. Letter Rul. 82-17,022, supra note 29, a wholly owned subsidiary of an
exempt hospital applied for a § 501(c)(3) exemption. The sole purpose of the applicant was to serve
as the general partner of a limited partnership with doctors who practiced at the hospital. The limited
partnership would build an office building for those doctors. The general partner would contribute the
ground lease to the partnership and the limited partners would contribute the capital. Income from
the project would be distributed in proportion to the partners' interests. The IRS approved the appli-
cant's exemption, noting the safeguards built into the arrangement, such as the general partner's
contribution being limited to the ground lease. The IRS concluded that although the applicant's activi-
ties would serve private interests, they would do so incidentally to the achievement of its exempt
purpose.
31. See IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 83-44,099 (Aug. 5, 1983), reprinted in IRS LETER RULINGS REP.
(CCH) No. 349 (Nov. 9, 1983) (limited partnership); IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 82-06,093 (Nov. 10,
1981), reprinted in IRS LTrER RULINGS REP. (CCH) No. 259 (Feb. 17, 1982) (joint venture).
32. Plumstead Theatre Soe'y v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th
Cir. 1982). See infra pp. 1362-63.
33. In Priv. Letter Rul. 78-20,058, a § 501(c)(3) organization sought to serve as the managing
general partner of a limited partnership dedicated to building subsidized housing for low-income sen-
ior citizens. The limited partners were to be allowed to receive an annual return on investment no
greater than eight percent. The IRS ruled that the applicant would jeopardize its exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) if it were to serve as a general partner. See IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 78-20,058 (Feb. 17,
1978), reprinted in IRS LETTER RULINGS REP. (CCH) No. 64 (May 23, 1978). The IRS has ruled
against § 501(c)(3) organizations' participating as general partners in at least two other instances. In
each of these two cases, the IRS reversed its position shortly after suit was brought in federal court.
See Wesley Housing Development Corp. Bests IRS in Major Victory For Nonprofits, Nat'!l Leased
Housing Assoc. Bull. 8 (undated); Telephone interview with Virginia Peters, Exec. Dir., Wesley
Housing Dev. Corp. (Apr. 1982) (discussing Strawbridge Square, Inc., housing development); Tele-
phone interview with Robert S. Scavone, Esq., Mclarter & English (Apr. 1983) (discussing New
Community Senior Citizen Housing Corp.).
In a recent private letter ruling, however, the IRS indicated that under certain conditions a charity
may act as a general partner of a limited partnership dedicated to building low- and moderate-income
housing. See I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-42,001 (undated), reprinted in IRS LEiTER RuLNGS REP.
(CCH) No. 347 (Oct. 26, 1983) (charity may act as general partner provided that steps are taken to
insulate it from conflicts of interest).
34. In Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, the IRS argued:
The question, then, becomes one of the extent to which that venture [a limited partnership to
produce a play] served the private interests of the investors. And the record clearly establishes
that serving their personal profit purpose was a significant, if not overriding, function of the
partnership venture . . . . Accordingly, we submit, it necessarily follows that more than an
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fiduciary duty to further the private interests of profit-motivated investors,
thereby conflicting with section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that the organiza-
tion operate exclusively for charitable purposes.35
C. The Plumstead Decision
To date, only one case, Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner,6
has addressed whether the participation of a section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion as a general partner in a limited partnership is incompatible with its
status as a charity. In Plumstead, a nonprofit theater organization in need
of additional capital to co-produce a play entered into a limited partner-
ship with profit-motivated individuals. For contributing $100,000 to the
partnership, the two limited partners received a 631 percent share in any
profits or losses resulting from the venture. The IRS argued before the
Tax Court that the charity's activities evidenced a substantial commercial
purpose and served private interests-both violations of the operational
test." In rejecting these contentions, the court found that the activities of
the Plumstead Theatre Society were clearly distinguishable from those of
commercial theater companies and hence did not evidence a substantial
commercial purpose.3 In addition, the court ruled that the charity did not
serve private interests in violation of the operational test. 9 Among the
factors which weighed in the Theatre Society's favor were the arm's
length nature of the transaction, the lack of any obligation to return the
limited partners' capital from the organization's own funds, and the lack
of any control by the limited partners.4°
The Plumstead decision stopped short of conferring a broad stamp of
approval on the use of limited partnerships by charities. Instead, the court
limited its analysis to the facts of the case.41 It is therefore likely that the
insubstantial part of Plumstead's activities . . . were in furtherance of that nonexempt
purpose.
Brief for Appellant at 11, Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
35. See id. at 11-12; IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 78-20,058, supra note 33; Gen. Counsel's Mem.
36293; Wesley Housing Developnent Corp. Bests IRS in Major Victory For Nonprofits, supra note
33, at 9.
36. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
37. Id. at 1328. The court noted, however, that the IRS had abandoned its contention that the
partnership arrangement violated the prohibition of inurement of net earnings to private individuals.
Id. at 1328 n.3.
38. Among the factors used by the Tax Court to differentiate Plumstead Theatre Society from
commercial theater groups were its nonprofit character, the emphasis on high standards, its attention
to the community, and the objective of promoting new and original productions. Id. at 1333.
39. Id. at 1333-34.
40. Id. It is not readily apparent how the factors enumerated by the Tax Court support the
argument that the limited partnership arrangement did not reflect a more than insubstantial purpose
to further private interests. Instead, the Tax Court's factors seem more appropriate to a holding that
no inurement of net earnings to private individuals or shareholders exists.
41. "We find this arrangement, limited to one play produced by petitioner, is no more intrusive or
1362
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IRS will continue to challenge charity participation in limited
partnerships.' 2
III. CHARITIES, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND TAX POLICY
As long as a charity takes certain precautions to avoid conflicts of inter-
est and transactions with parties who control its operations, it should be
permitted to serve as general partner of a partnership dedicated to fur-
thering exempt purposes.
A. Third Party Benefits and the Operational Test
Many of the IRS objections to charities serving as general partners
stem from adherence to an operational test that sometimes fails to focus on
factors relevant to whether a section 501(c)(3) organization uses its re-
sources in an appropriate manner to further charitable objectives. Follow-
ing a description and critique of the current application of the operational
test, this section will propose an approach for analyzing whether benefits
accruing to unrelated individuals as a by-product of a charity's activities
violate the principles underlying section 501(c)(3). This approach will
then be applied to the participation of charities in limited partnerships.
1. Current Application of the Operational Test
Under the operational test, a court must examine an organization's ac-
tivities, from which it will infer one or more purposes.43 If any purpose is
judged to be more than insubstantial and non-exempt, the organization
will lose its section 501(c)(3) status. Where one activity furthers both ex-
empt and non-exempt purposes, courts will revoke or deny the organiza-
tion's section 501(c)(3) status if the non-exempt purpose is judged to be
more than insubstantial." For example, in Better Business Bureau v.
indicative of private interests than the contractual, percentage arrangement approved of in Broadway
Theatre League v. United States .... " Id. at 1334. In Broadway Theatre League, 293 F. Supp. 346
(W.D. Va. 1968), the court held that a contractual relationship under which a theatrical booking
agent received a percentage of a charity's membership dues neither violated the operational test nor
constituted prohibited inurement of net earnings to shareholders or individuals.
42. Kaplan, Real Estate Opportunities For Tax-Exempt Organizations: Potential and Pitfalls
After Plumstead Theatre, 61 TAXES 291, 302 (1983) ("What is reasonably certain is that the IRS
will most likely continue to challenge the Plumstead Theatre type of transaction.").
43. See B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978) ("Under the operational test,
the purpose towards which an organization's activities are directed, and not the nature of the activities
themselves, is ultimately dispositive of the organization's right to be classified as a section 501(c)(3)
organization exempt from tax under section 501(a).").
44. See Copyright Clearance Center v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 793, 803-07 (1982) (copyright
clearinghouse served substantial non-exempt purpose); Kentucky Bar Found. v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 921, 926 (1982) (non-exempt purposes of bar association insubstantial); Ann Arbor Dog Train-
ing Club v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 207, 212-13 (1980) (dog training is substantial non-exempt
purpose).
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United States,4" the Supreme Court rejected the application for tax-
exempt status 40 of an organization dedicated to improving business meth-
ods and educating the public. The Court held that the same activities that
furthered the exempt purpose of education also furthered the non-exempt
purpose of benefiting the private business community. It did not matter
that the non-exempt purpose was not the primary purpose of the organi-
zation; as long as it was a substantial one, it constituted a violation of the
operational test. 7
Under the current operational test, when unrelated third parties receive
benefits from a charity's activities, a court must determine whether the
benefits reflect a substantial non-exempt purpose.4 In administering the
operational test, the IRS and the courts will sometimes consider the mag-
nitude of the private benefit to be determinative, 49 while in other in-
stances, if either the IRS or the court deems the private benefit necessary
to the achievement of an exempt purpose, the private benefit is considered
insubstantial regardless of its size.50
2. Applying the Operational Test to Third Party Benefits
Current application of the operational test may be faulted on at least
two grounds. First, inferring purposes from activities is inherently subjec-
tive and imprecise. Thus, the current operational test is an open invitation
to make decisions based more on intuition than on analysis. Second, once
45. 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
46. The petitioner in Better Business Bureau applied for an exemption from social security taxes
under former § 811(b)(8) of the Social Security Act. The provisions exempting charities from the
Social Security tax were very similar to those exempting charities from federal income taxation. Coin-
pare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) with Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 811(b)(8), 49 Stat.
620, 639 (1935).
47. The Court held: "In this instance in order to fall within the claimed exemption, an organiza-
tion must be devoted to educational purposes exclusively. This plainly means that the presence of a
single non-educational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the
number or importance of truly educational purposes." 326 U.S. at 283.
48. See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 344-45 (1980) (organization
running art gallery which sold paintings and distributed 80% of proceeds to artists did not evidence
substantial private purpose); Christian Stewardship Assistance v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037,
1043-44 (1978) (organization providing financial counseling for donors to charities failed operational
test due to more than insubstantial purpose of benefiting private individuals).
49. For example, in Gen. Counsel's Mem. 38497, the IRS stated that an organization which
provided financial assistance to minority entrepreneurs did not violate the operational test since the
benefit to individuals who themselves are not the proper objects of charity would be limited. "As we
have previously stated, section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(l)(ii) of the regulations, which requires operation for
public purposes, is satisfied only if the private benefit yielded by the activity in question is qualifitive-
ly [sic] and quantitatively incidental to the overall public benefit conferred by the activity." (emphasis
added). Id.
50. See, e.g., Broadway Theatre League, 293 F. Supp. at 355 (payment to booking agent of per-
centage of § 501(c)(3) organization's membership dues does not violate operational test); Science &
Research Found. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 526, 528-29 (S.D. I1. 1960) (extensive contractual
relations with publisher do not jeopardize § 501(c)(3) status); Goldsboro Art League, 75 T.C. at
344-45 (art gallery distributing 80% of proceeds to artists did not violate operational test).
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a court finds a suspected non-exempt purpose, a similarly standardless
inquiry begins to determine whether the alleged purpose is more than
insubstantial. Because of the confusion inherent in the operational test,
charities cannot plan their activities with confidence that the IRS will not
challenge their section 501(c)(3) status. The inconsistent stance of the IRS
regarding charities' participation in limited partnerships is just one mani-
festation of the uncertainty surrounding the operational test.
The operational test is particularly ill-suited for dealing with limited
partnerships, where activities in furtherance of charitable objectives also
generate benefits for unrelated private parties. 51 Absent irrational behav-
ior or fraudulent motives, those in control of charities have little incentive
to benefit unrelated individuals or entities. Therefore, inferring a specific
purpose to benefit private individuals merely from the existence of large
or potentially large pecuniary benefits flowing to these persons is unwar-
ranted. In most instances these benefits will merely be the by-product of a
charity's purchasing the goods and services it requires.
The IRS has tried repeatedly to deny section 501(c)(3) status to non-
profit organizations on the ground that they possess a more than insub-
stantial purpose to benefit unrelated parties. Despite these attempts,
courts have usually recognized that such benefits do not, by themselves,
prove a non-exempt purpose.52 These benefits are usually characterized as
incidental to the achievement of the charity's exempt purpose rather than
indicative of a separate, substantial non-exempt objective.5" Therefore,
both logic and precedent support the adoption of a presumption that the
flow of benefits to unrelated private parties as a result of activities that
further a charity's exempt purpose does not constitute a substantial non-
exempt purpose and therefore does not violate the operational test. This
presumption should apply regardless of the magnitude of the benefits to
third parties."
51. Unrelated private parties are those persons who do not fall within the ban on inurement of
net earnings to private shareholders and individuals. See infra note 69.
52. See cases cited supra note 50. The IRS has acknowledged that in certain factual settings,
benefits to unrelated individuals do not constitute a substantial non-exempt purpose. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174, 176 (organization that constructed and subsidized private medical
facilities in order to lure physician to isolated rural community did not violate operational test); Rev.
Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113 (radiologist not in control of hospital may receive a fixed percentage of
his department's revenues).
53. See Goldsboro Art League, 75 T.C. at 345 ("[P]etitioner's sales ativities [sic] are incidental to
its other activities . . .).
54. The presumption that third-party benefits generated by charitable activities do not constitute a
substantial, non-exempt purpose may be rebutted by evidence indicating that the intent of those in
control of the charity was to benefit private parties rather than the public.
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3. Supplementing the Operational Test
Although the flow of benefits to unrelated individuals may not reflect
an intent to benefit those parties, it may indicate that the charity is wast-
ing its resources. 5 The waste of a charity's resources violates a central
premise underlying the charitable income tax exemption and the tax de-
duction for charitable donations: The activities of private charities lessen
the burdens of government and ultimately save it money. 8 Section
501(c)(3)'s requirements that a charity be operated exclusively for exempt
purposes and that the charity's net earnings not inure to the benefit of
private individuals or shareholders 57 serve to maximize the beneficial im-
pact of the government subsidy and thus reflect a concern that charitable
resources not be wasted.""
Therefore, the federal government has a legitimate interest in prohibit-
ing third-party benefits when they constitute a waste of the charity's re-
sources. The waste standard would operate not as a replacement for the
operational test, but as an adjunct to it.59 If the IRS could prove that the
benefits result from activities that waste the charity's assets, the organiza-
tion would be denied section 501(c)(3) status.
The IRS might have difficulty proving that a charity's activities squan-
dered assets in violation of the waste standard. Many frequently used in-
dicators of good management, such as fair market value and common bus-
55. This waste may occur either through faulty design of the charity's programs or through mis-
management of day-to-day operations. For example, persons with whom a charity contracts for goods
or services may earn unusually large profits merely because those in control of the charity may be
mismanaging its affairs, leading it to pay inflated prices for the goods and services it needs.
56. See supra note 16.
57. The inurement prohibition also functions to encourage donors to contribute private funds for
public purposes. Hansmann calls the prohibition on distribution of a nonprofit organization's net
earnings to persons who maintain control over that organization the "nondistribution constraint." See
Hansmann, supra note 6, at 838. In his theory of the role of the nonprofit sector, he argues that
nonprofit entities emerge to deal with situations of market failure where competition is insufficient to
stop profit-motivated entities from charging excessive prices for inferior goods. Id. at 843-44. The
nondistribution constraint is "the essential characteristic" that enables nonprofit organizations to over-
come problems of market failure. Id. at 873. The absence of any distribution of profits to persons in
control of the nonprofit organization destroys any incentive on the part of the organization to charge
uncompetitive prices. Id. at 844.
Hansmann argues that market failure would occur in the absence of the nondistribution constraint
for many charitable activities. Contributors to organizations designed to assist needy persons usually
have no connection to the recipients of assistance and therefore little opportunity to monitor and police
the services provided. An organization not subject to the nondistribution constraint would have a
strong incentive to divert contributions to its owners or controlling shareholders. The nondistribution
constraint (in the case of § 501(c)(3) organizations-the inurement prohibition) eliminates this incen-
tive and therefore enables the contributor to entrust the organization with his charitable gift. Id. at
847.
58. Cf Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73
HARv. L. REv. 433, 434 (1960) (arguing that public sector must minimize waste of charitable assets).
59. The waste standard may also be used as an adjunct to the operational test where no benefits
to private parties are at issue. The policies that support minimizing the waste of a charity's assets in
the third party benefit context apply with equal strength to other activities of charities.
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iness standards, may have limited value when applied to the operations of
charities.60 Moreover, when courts do apply such measures, they may lack
the competence to judge whether the organization has wasted its assets.
The burden of proof that the waste standard would place upon the
IRS, however, is not insurmountable. The IRS would be able to monitor
the activities of a section 501(c)(3) organization through both applications
for exemption and the annual informational returns required under the
Internal Revenue Code, in much the same way as it now detects whether
substantial non-exempt purposes exist;61 the waste standard simply re-
quires the IRS to go one step further and demonstrate that benefits accru-
ing to the non-exempt third parties detract from the organization's chari-
table mission by wasting its resources.
In addition, the IRS will not be the sole guarantor of a charity's effec-
tive management. Both market forces and legal sanctions encourage chari-
ties to conserve their resources. Charities that have records of efficient
operation and achievement of charitable goals will more easily attract do-
nations and investor capital. Furthermore, directors or trustees who mis-
manage the charity's assets may be liable under state law for violation of
the fiduciary duty of care they owe to the organization.6"
A presumption that benefits to third parties do not evidence a substan-
tial non-exempt purpose coupled with a requirement that the benefits not
result from a waste of the charity's assets will not necessarily be more
lenient than the current application of the substantiality test. Despite the
emphasis on the magnitude of private benefit implied by the substantiality
test, many courts ignore the size of the private benefit altogether and con-
centrate instead on whether the benefit was a by-product of an activity in
60. In some instances, there will be nothing with which to compare the activities of charitable
organizations. For example, charitable organizations may become involved in endeavors that other
organizations have neglected due to low profitability or high risk. Therefore, there may be no stan-
dard against which to judge whether the return to investors in the activity is reasonable. The quality
of a charity's output will also be a factor bearing on the waste standard. In some instances a §
501(c)(3) organization may form to provide services of a higher quality than is provided by non-
charitable organizations. Determining whether these high quality services result from a waste of re-
sources might be difficult for either the IRS or courts to judge.
61. In order to receive federal tax exemption, most nonprofit organizations must file an applica-
tion with the IRS. This application requires information describing the organization's activities, a
copy of its articles of organization and bylaws, and a financial statement showing its assets, liabilities,
receipts, and disbursements. The IRS may request additional information which it deems necessary.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(a)(3) (1960). For a description of the application process, see B. HoPKINs,
supra note 8, at 547-66. Most exempt organizations must also file annual informational returns with
the IRS. The return requires the exempt organization to state all items of income, receipts, and
disbursements. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (1982).
62. See, e.g., Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (trustees of charity held liable for mismanagement and self-
dealing); Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1970) (directors
liable for mismanagement of charity's assets).
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furtherance of exempt purposes. 3 Therefore, in many instances, the addi-
tional requirement proposed above-that the third-party benefits not con-
stitute a waste of the charity's assets-will toughen, rather than relax, the
standard, consistent with the policies underlying section 501(c)(3).
Charities should not lose their section 501(c)(3) status merely because
their participation in limited partnerships generates benefits for their lim-
ited partners. As long as the partnership's activities further charitable
objectives, benefits to the unrelated investors should be presumed not to
indicate a substantial, non-exempt purpose under the operational test.
The charity's participation as a general partner does not necessarily waste
assets dedicated to charitable purposes. To the contrary, the partnership
activities may well further charitable purposes. Without access to private
capital, the charity might not be able to carry out its exempt purpose,
whether it be producing plays, constructing housing, or building hospi-
tals."' Far from wasting foregone tax revenues or donated gifts, the section
501(c)(3) organization is, through the limited partnership, able to harness
private funds for its public purpose. As long as the returns to the limited
partners are within the range of returns for similarly risky projects, it is
unlikely the IRS would be able to prove such an arrangement to be a
waste of the charity's resources.6 "
B. Conflict of Interest and Private Inurement
Two other objections to charities' serving as general partners center on
the extent of the limited partners' control over the operations of their gen-
eral partner. First, the IRS has argued that the nonprofit general part-
ner's fiduciary obligation6 6 to further the private interests of its limited
partners may create a conflict of interest and force the charity to engage in
practices that conflict with its public, charitable purpose.6"
63. See cases cited supra note 50.
64. See Plumnstead Theatre Soc'y, 74 T.C. at 1328; Brief for Appellee at 48-49, Pluinstead Thea-
tre Soc'y, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982); Black, Nonprofit Firn Sells Shares To Finance Housing
Project, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 11, 1983, at 16, col. 3.
65. Excessive returns to limited partners would indicate a waste of charitable resources since those
funds would otherwise belong to the charity and be available to further its exempt objectives.
66. A general partner is under a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of its limited partners. See
Riviera Congress Assoc. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392(1966); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928); Beane, The Fiduci-
ary Relationship of a Partner, 5 J. CORP. LAw 483 (1980).
67. For example, in Gen. Counsel's Mem. 36293, the IRS examined the participation by a §
501(c)(3) applicant in a limited partnership to build and operate subsidized housing. Its opinion that
the application should be rejected rested in part on the charity's role as general partner:
Such participation would be inherently incompatible with being operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes within the meaning of Code § 501(c)(3).
By agreeing to serve as the general partner of the proposed housing project, the Corporation
would take on an obligation to further the private financial interests of the limited partners.
Since the promotion of those private interests would tend to foster operating and maintenance
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A second objection concerns section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on the in-
urement of a charity's net earnings to private individuals and sharehold-
ers. The inurement clause is widely believed to be aimed at individuals
who maintain some control over a charity and are thus in a position to
divert its revenues to their own purposes."s Both treasury regulations and
case law support the view that the clause is limited to a prohibition on
self-dealing by insiders of the charity such as officers, directors, and large
contributors.69 A minority view, however, advances the proposition that
the proscribed inurement of net earnings also includes benefits received by
non-insider third parties who maintain some level of control or influence
over the charity."0
An IRS attorney who adheres to this minority position on inurement
argued in a recent article that the fiduciary duty owed by the charity to its
partners is a legally enforceable obligation and therefore constitutes "con-
siderable control" by the limited partners over the organization. 1 Under
this theory, the income earned by limited partners of the charity therefore
constitutes an inurement of net earnings.
The inurement objection to charities' serving as general partners, like
the concern over conflict of interest, is premised on the view that private
investors have control over the actions of charities by virtue of the fiduci-
ary duty owed by one partner to another. Even if one were willing to
accept this proposition, these duties can be modified or waived by the
practices favoring the equity holdings of the limited partners to a greater extent than would
otherwise be justifiable on the basis of reasonable financial solvency, the Corporation's as-
sumption of a duty to promote such interests in its capacity as general partner would necessar-
ily create a conflict of interest that is legally incompatible with its being operated exclusively
for charitable purposes. (emphasis added)
Gen. Counsel's Mem. 36293. But see IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 83-42,001, supra note 33 (permitting §
501(c)(3) organization to serve as general partner in low-income housing limited partnership).
68. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 8, at 211; P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAX EXEMPT CHARi-
TABLE ORGANIZATIONS 166 (2d ed. 1983).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (1960) defines "private shareholder or individual" as "persons
having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization." See Science and Research
Found. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 526, 529 (S.D. Ill. 1960) (contractual relationship with book
publisher not inurement); Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 345-46 (1980) (pay-
ment of sales proceeds to artists not inurement); People of G-d Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
127, 133 (1980) (emphasizing that "private shareholder or individual" does not refer to unrelated
third parties); see also R. DESIDERIO & S. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at § 12.04, at 12-10 (inurement
clause does not refer to unrelated parties).
70. In EST v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1067 (1979), the court denied a tax exemption to a corpo-
ration formed to train people in a behavioral therapy called Erhardt Seminar Training (EST). The
petitioner had entered into an agreement with the for-profit corporation that controlled the rights to
EST programs in which the for-profit corporation would receive 50% of the petitioner's gross pro-
ceeds in return for providing trainers, managers, and materials, The court held that the petitioner
operated for the purpose of subsidizing a profit-seeking corporation and therefore failed the opera-
tional test. Although never explicitly stated, there is considerable language in the decision to indicate
that the court also found proscribed inurement of net earnings since the for-profit corporation "exerts
considerable control over petitioner's activities." 71 T.C. at 1080.
71. Kaplan, supra note 42, at 300-01.
1369
HeinOnline  -- 93 Yale L.J. 1369 1983-1984
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 1355, 1984
partners themselvesJ 2 By carefully drafting the partnership agreement,73
a charity can free itself from any obligation to take actions contrary to its
charitable purpose.7 4
C. Unfair Competition and the Transfer of Tax Benefits
Concerns that reach beyond issues of qualification under section
501(c)(3) may underly the IRS' ambivalent attitude toward charities that
serve as general partners. The IRS may fear that the charities' activities
would harm unrelated parties and place them at a competitive disadvan-
tage in the marketplace for investors' capital. The IRS may also suspect
that charities and private investors use limited partnerships primarily to
create tax-avoidance opportunities. Neither of these concerns, however,
warrants barring charities from serving as general partners.
72. See Riviera Congress Assoc. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 227
N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966) ("[Plartners may include in the partnership articles practically 'any agree-
ment they wish' . . . and, if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and authorized, it
would not ipsofacto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful."); Bassan v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 83 Wash.
2d 922, 925, 524 P.2d 233, 236 (1974). But cf. Note, Disclosure, Fairness and Substantive Adminis-
trative Regulation of A General Partner's Fiduciary Duty in a Real Estate Limited Partnership, 50
WASH. L. REV. 977, 990-91 (1975) (suggesting that courts may in future analyze fairness of transac-
tion to limited partners).
73. A recent private letter ruling admits that the role of general partner "should not per se result
in denial of section 501(c)(3) status." See IRS Priv. Letter Rul. 83-42,001, supra note 33. The IRS
permitted a charity to serve as the general partner of several limited partnerships formed to construct
federally subsidized low-income housing. The IRS "closely scrutinized" the proposed arrangement
and determined that the § 501(c)(3) organization had sufficiently insulated itself from potential con-
flicts of interest. Id. In particular, the IRS noted that the partnership agreement restricted participa-
tion by the limited partners and that the federal government set limits on tenant rents and on partner-
ship distributions. Id.
A further safeguard against private investors' gaining control over the operations of the § 501(c)(3)
general partner is the nature of the limited partnership arrangement itself. Of all types of joint activ-
ity, the limited partnership form is the most restrictive in terms of the control it allows limited part-
ners. In return for limited liability, limited partners relinquish any right to participate in the manage-
ment of the partnership. See Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 535-36, 223 N.E.2d 869,
873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 383 (1966); UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969);
Feld, The Control Test For Linited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1471, 1472-73 (1969).
74. Issues of control and conflict of interest are not confined to the limited partnership vehicle;
similar problems are currently facing tax-exempt universities and corporate sponsors of research. In-
creasingly, profit-motivated entities provide funds to educational institutions, and, in exchange, utilize
their faculty's research expertise for commercial purposes. Because the two parties have similar, but
not identical, interests and goals, conflicts will arise over issues such as the choice of research projects,
the publicity of research findings, and the ownership of patent rights. Regardless of whether the
formal structure of the relationship between the two entities is governed by a contract for services or a
limited partnership agreement, the university must insulate its educational purpose from undue com-
mercial influence. See NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH RELATIONSHIPS
21 (1982); Business and Universities: A New Partnership, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 20, 1982, at 58; Business
Goes To College, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1982, at 196; Conflict of Interest on the American Campus, ECON-
OMIST, May 22, 1982, at 107; Sanger, Corporate Links Worry Scholars, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982,
at F4, col. 3.
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1. Unfair Competition
Whenever a tax-exempt organization carries on commercial activities,
charges of unfair competition are bound to arise. 5 Some might argue that
a section 501(c)(3) general partner possesses an unfair advantage in at-
tracting capital for its projects: It can use its tax exemption and ability to
attract tax-deductible donations to offer limited partners a more lucrative
distribution of the tax benefits and income from a project than could a
profit-motivated general partner. 6  Section 501(c)(3) general partners
would thus unfairly compete with their for-profit counterparts.
Concerns about unfair competition, however, do not provide a persua-
sive rationale for prohibiting charities from serving as general partners.
First, charities will often not be competing with profit-motivated firms for
investor capital.77 Second, there is no evidence to indicate that a charitable
organization's preferential tax treatment makes it likely to offer terms any
more advantageous to investors than those offered by profit-motivated gen-
eral partners.7 8 Third, even if it could be shown that a section 501(c)(3)
organization did tend to offer better terms, the unfair competition argu-
75. The controversy over unfair competition by tax-exempt organizations climaxed in 1950 with
the passage of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, which taxes exempt organizations on income from
"any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such
organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or perform-
ance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function consituting the
basis for its exemption under Section 501. ... IRC § 513(a) (1976). Among the reasons for the
tax was Congress' fear that the tax exemption granted to certain nonprofit organizations under §
501(c) would enable them to compete unfairly with profit-motivated, taxable businesses by allowing
them to acccumulate capital for expansion and undercut the prices of their competitors. See S. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3053, 3081.
76. For projects which require the same capital investments and return the same income streams,
the tax-exempt organization will have a higher return on investment than will the taxable entity. In
times of scarce capital, the tax-exempt organization may be able to make a higher bid for investment
dollars due to the greater net (after-tax) income it will receive. The ability of the charity to receive tax
deductible donations provides an additional cushion allowing the nonprofit organization to make the
terms of the transaction even more attractive to investors.
77. Many activities carried out by charities are unattractive to profit-motivated firms. See supra
note 24.
78. Several scholars have criticized, on theoretical grounds, allegations that tax-exempt organiza-
tions compete unfairly. For example, Kaplan argues that the contention that tax-exempt organizations
charge lower prices for their output than do taxable entities has not been proven. He also doubts
whether tax-exempt organizations would be likely to initiate a price war. See Kaplan, Intercollegiate
Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1464-66 (1980). Other
commentators argue that because the corporate income tax is levied only on profits, it will not affect
total output under competitive conditions since industries will produce until the cost of another unit of
output equals the additional revenue it will bring. See Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20
UCLA L. REV. 13, 62 (1972); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business By Tax-
Exempt Organizations, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 591 (1965). But cf Hansmann, supra note 23, at
564-65 (hypothesizing that "because the managers of a nonprofit have no direct financial stake in the
residual earnings of the enterprise, they may be willing to agree to a more generous interest rate on
borrowed money than necessary, simply to avoid the personal effort involved in seeking out a better
deal"); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 24, at 1026-36 (unfair competition may occur under oligopolistic
market conditions or when nonprofit organizations enter a particular market unanticipated by profit-
motivated competitors).
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ment cannot be restricted to investment opportunities offered by charities
as general partners. If unfair competition by charities is a problem, it is
one that bears on almost all transactions by charities in the marketplace.
Since charitable organizations must be allowed to carry on commercial
transactions in the open market to accomplish their charitable goals, there
is no principled basis for singling out limited partnership activities for
disqualification. Finally, as long as the activity that leads to "unfair com-
petition" is in furtherance of the charity's exempt purpose, congressional
policy, as reflected by the Unrelated Business Income Tax, is to allow the
activity to go forward unimpeded."9
2. Transfer of Tax Benefits
Some investors join with charities in limited partnerships to take advan-
tage of the tax benefits generated by the partnership's activities.8" Simi-
larly, charities may sometimes seek out limited partners to utilize the tax
benefits that they might otherwise be unable to use because of their non-
taxable status.8" If one views the federal tax provisions exempting chari-
ties from the corporate income tax and allowing them to receive deductible
donations as government subsidies,8" the additional funds made available
through the transfer of tax benefits to the limited partner may constitute a
"third subsidy" to charities. This additional subsidy to charities may un-
dercut one of the principal justifications for according them preferential
tax treatment-that charities save the public sector money by lessening the
burdens of government.8"
The question whether tax-exempt organizations should be able to
79. IRC § 513(a) (1982) exempts from the Unrelated Business Income Tax those activities that
are "substantially related" to the pursuit of the organization's exempt purpose regardless of any com-
petition with profit-motivated entities.
80. For example, investors in low-income housing syndications are typically motivated by the
prospect of receiving significant deductions for accelerated depreciation and interest payments.
81. Due to its exempt status, a charity cannot directly utilize the tax deductions generated by its
activities. Entering into a limited partnership permits it to raise additional capital in return for a
portion of the tax deductions and income generated by the project.
82. Professor Surrey views the deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 170 for contributions to § 501(c)(3)
organizations as a tax expenditure or subsidy to the donor's personal charitable choices. See S. SuR-
REY, supra note 3, at 224-25. Under this theory, the contribution should be treated as an item of
consumption comparable to other personal expenditures. Several other commentators, however, have
argued that deducting charitable donations from gross income is appropriate in computing taxable
income and therefore not a subsidy. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 56-62; cf. Andrews, supra note 18,
at 355-56 (arguing that donations to charities should not be considered consumption of the donor).
83. It should be noted that the limited partnership arrangement may sometimes provide more
money to the Treasury in terms of tax revenue than it costs in "transferred" tax benefits. If the
charity were to carry out its activities alone, the income it earned would not be taxable. The limited
partners' share of the income from the same activities, however, would be taxable. Therefore, where
tax revenue received from the limited partners exceeds the tax revenue lost through the transfer of
deductions, the Treasury may receive more than if the activity had been carried out by the charity
alone.
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transfer tax benefits to taxable entities has become a matter of recent con-
gressional concern. Because of increased fiscal pressures and the acceler-
ated depreciation provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,4
federal, state, and local governments, as well as other tax-exempt entities,
have used sale-leaseback transactions to take advantage of tax benefits.8 5
As a result of several well-publicized leasing transactions,"' federal legis-
lation to curb the practice appears imminent.8 7
Concern about the potential for a transfer of tax benefits should not,
however, lead to the invalidation of a charity's participation as a general
partner in a limited partnership. In most situations, the limited partners
will be investing most of the capital for the partnership's activities and
84. I.R.C. § 168 (1982). In 1981, in an effort to stimulate investment in plants and equipment,
Congress enacted § 168 which provides for the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS). For property placed in service after 1980, the cost of the property is recovered over a much
shorter period than prior depreciation schedules tied to useful life had provided. For example, prior to
the 1981 Act, real property was depreciated over a period of up to forty years. Under the ACRS
schedule, the cost of real property may be recovered over fifteen years. Since a current deduction is
usually worth more than a deferred deduction, Congress anticipated that adoption of ACRS would
spur investment in depreciable assets. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 153.
85. A typical sale-leaseback will consist of a tax-exempt entity selling equipment or other prop-
erty to a taxable entity which is able to deduct depreciation and interest expenses, and where availa-
ble, claim an investment tax credit. The tax-exempt organization then leases the property back, fre-
quently at a below market rental that reflects a portion of the tax benefits.
86. For example, in recent years the Navy has leased ships from private owners rather than
procuring them itself. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG. 1ST SESS., TAX
ASPECTS OF FEDERAL LEASING ARRANGEMENTs 4-8 (Joint Comm. Print 1983). In addition, local
governments have sold and leased back public buildings such as museums and performing arts centers.
See CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL LEASING 7-9 (1983) (report pre-
pared for Subcomm. on Oversight of House Ways and Means Comm.). Private colleges and universi-
ties have leased back entire campuses to earn additional revenues. See id. at 8; College To Try Leasing
To Wipe Out Its Debts, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
87. A bill recently passed by the House of Representatives is designed to curb practices in which
tax-exempt entities use properties that are owned for tax purposes by taxable entities. The bill
reduces the incentives for taxable entities to enter into such transactions by lengthening the recovery
periods over which depreciation deductions must be taken for property designated "tax exempt use
property." For example, whereas real property owned and occupied by taxable entities is subject to a
fifteen year recovery period under ACRS, see supra note 84, the same property would be subject to a
forty year recovery period if it fell within the definition of tax-exempt use property. Tax-exempt use
property primarily includes depreciable property leased to tax-exempt entities under long-term leases.
Recognizing that taxpayers could achieve tax results similar to those achieved through sale-
leasebacks by owning property in a partnership, the bill provides for treatment that would curb trans-
fers of tax benefits for these transactions too. Under the bill, if a tax-exempt partner does not receive
the same share of income or gain as he does of deductions or credits, then that proportion of the
property that bears a relation to the tax-exempt entity's share of income or gain will be treated as tax-
exempt use property and therefore be subject to an extended recovery period. See H.R. 4170, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H2629 (1984).
If H.R. 4170 becomes law, it is likely that its provisions would not substantially affect many trans-
actions in which charities serve as general partners. Many of these partnerships do not own substan-
tial depreciable assets. See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980) (partner-
ship to produce a play). Furthermore, for many of the partnerships that do own depreciable property,
the tax-exempt entity's share of partnership income or gain is miniscule. See IRS Priv. Letter Rul.
83-42,001, supra note 33 (tax-exempt general partner made nominal or no capital contribution and
received management fees only).
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therefore should be entitled to any concomitant tax benefits."8 Forbidding
the participation of the charity as general partner or depriving limited
partners of a ratable share of their tax deductions solely because their
general partner is a tax-exempt organization would penalize both parties
rather than take away an undeserved advantage. If existing safeguards
against the shifting of tax deductions are deemed inadequate, a more rea-
sonable alternative would be the enactment of stricter partnership alloca-
tion rules, allowing the taxable partners to receive only those tax benefits
that bear a direct relationship to their share of capital contributions or
income.89
CONCLUSION
In many instances a charity may find that joining with unrelated,
profit-motivated investors in a limited partnership will be the best method
for achieving its charitable purpose. In such instances, as long as the part-
nership agreement sufficiently protects the section 501(c)(3) organization
from potential conflicts of interest and provides for distributions of profit
and loss that have economic substance, the charity should be permitted to
serve as general partner without jeopardizing its tax exemption.
-Michael H. Schill
88. The Code provides a safeguard against abusive tax shelters by requiring that an agreed-upon
allocation of income and loss be ignored if the allocation "does not have substantial economic effect."
I.R.C. § 704(b) (1982). In such instances, income and losses will be distributed according to the
partners' interests in the partnership. Therefore, if it appears that a charity joined with limited part-
ners for the purpose of transferring tax benefits (such as by allocating to the limited partners tax
losses that are disproportionate to their capital contributions), then the allocation will be voidable if it
does not otherwise meet the substantial economic effect test. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b), 48 Fed.
Reg. 9871 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-1(b)) (proposed June 23, 1980).
89. This is similar to the approach adopted by H.R. 4170. See supra note 87.
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